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On Civic Republicanism

Ancient Lessons for Global Politics

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Preface: A Return to Classical Regimes Theory

DAVID EDWARD TABACHNICK
AND TOIVO KOIVUKOSKI

On the Plural Dimensions of *Politeia*

In politics, the term regime (derived from the Latin *regere*, to rule), describes a particular form of government or administration. So, we speak in terms of "democratic regimes" and "authoritarian regimes" as well as the "Obama regime" and the "Bush regime." Used this way, the word is merely a synonym. More often, the term regime is used in the pejorative to indicate the rule of an illegitimate leader or organization, as in the "Gadhafi regime" or a "terrorist regime." Here, it is a rhetorical tool used to describe a rogue or dangerous state or group, internationally irresponsible and devoid of civic obligations.

In contemporary political science, "regime" has been employed as a technical mode of analysis in international relations theory, where, instead of a state, government, or rogue element, a regime is any set of norms and values coupled with mechanisms of governance and regulation.¹ Through the lens of social science, "regimes theory" broadens the meaning of the word to pertain to a hodgepodge of international agencies, multilateral organizations, and regulatory bodies. In this treatment, there seems almost no limit to what qualifies as a regime: everything from a collective security pact such as NATO to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna. Unfortunately, if the goal of this theory is to help us better understand global politics, its overly broad definition of regime seems to stand in the way.

By contrast, classical political science defines "regime" in a rather specific way. The Greek *politeia* denotes a particular kind of *polis* or a constitutional classification of a political community. Aristotle, notably,

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To compare Carlo Collodi's *The Adventures of Pinocchio* with Plato's *Laws* is to invite a smile, whether of bemused curiosity or wry disdain. The *Laws* is the carefully worked, sometimes even labored, last word of a great genius. *Pinocchio* is an accidental novel written by an Italian republican who served as a soldier and public official and worked as a journalist,¹ albeit in each capacity a man of the second or even third tier. Plato (427–347 BC) without the *Laws* remains what he is. Collodi (AD 1826–90) without *Pinocchio* fades into obscurity. That having been said, it is possible for the genius and the journalist to observe the same kind of political crisis which they rightly perceive to be a moral crisis first and a political crisis second, neither of which can be resolved without resolving the other. Both knew what Plato's pupil put most succinctly, that to get politics right, it is necessary to get education right. Aristotle opines in the opening lines of the final book of his *Politics*:

No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of youth; for the neglect of education does harm to the constitution. The citizen should be moulded to suit the form of government under which he lives. For each government has a peculiar character which originally formed and which continues to preserve it. The character of democracy creates democracy, and the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy; and always the better the character, the better the government.²

What Plato – at least in the *Laws* – and Collodi shared was their commitment to the best possible (rather than the best conceivable) government and, therefore also, to the best possible education. The present chapter compares a single motif from Plato, his puppet in the *Laws*, and the

entirety of Collodi's most memorable and important work, his children's novel *The Adventures of Pinocchio*. That comparison is made in relation to a political state of affairs in their respective countries about which each man felt both satisfaction and frustration. Some part of their ideals had become actual, and yet each saw how precariously situated were the best parts of the regime under which he lived. Nine years after Plato's death (347 BC), Philip of Macedon brought Athens decisively within the sphere of his power. By 322, Macedonian hegemony was complete, and the glory days of Athens were in the past. For the forty years after the publication of *Pinocchio*, Italy wavered between uncertainty and chaos until 1922 when Mussolini marched on Rome, and Italy's republican vision yielded to fascism. In parallel contexts, each man offered his contemporaries the notion of a puppet as metaphor for human formation and fulfilment as citizen. In both cases, the prophetic character of that metaphor went unheeded. From the comparison, finally, a few observations shall be derived which might help clarify a republican vision for the future.

If one simply adds together the pages of the *Republic*, *Statesman*, and *Laws*, one sees that Plato committed more than a third of his writing to explicitly political themes. Moreover, those themes can be traced throughout the body of his work. One such theme is his concern for the rational pursuit of virtue as a necessary precondition for the realization of the right political constitution. Whether Plato's political dialogues be read as a call for revolution or merely reform, it is clear that he was profoundly dissatisfied with the status quo in Athens. Otherwise, why would he have written so much in urging the establishment of a different state of affairs? Glenn R. Morrow writes:

The *Laws* shows that Plato thought the Athenians of his own day had departed from the moderation that characterized their ancestors. In the *Gorgias* Socrates refuses to accord the name of statesman to the great leaders of the age following the Persian Wars (515c–519a). It is true that they provided the city with walls, docks, shipyards, and all the attributes of wealth and power, but they failed to make the citizens better; in fact they made them worse, and this shows that they lacked the fundamental requirement of the political art. In the *Republic*, Plato pictures democracy as close to the lower limit in the scale of political value ... The faults he finds with it ... are those he saw in the democracy he knew best, that of fourth century Athens. But there is another view of Athens sometimes presented in the dialogues ... In the *Meno* (93e, 94b,d) and *Protagoras* (319e)

the great statesmen described in the *Gorgias* – Themistocles, Pericles, Thucydides, Aristides – are cited as examples of wisdom and civic virtue. How they acquired their excellences seems to be a mystery, and it is clear they did not know how to teach them to their sons.³

The “sons” of “the great statesmen” sentenced Socrates to death. The grandsons were those who managed Athenian affairs in the first half of the fourth century. Though they did make Athens safe for philosophy – clearly a Platonic prerequisite for the right kind of politics – nevertheless they were not able to thwart Philip of Macedon.⁴ Over the course of Plato's lifetime, Athens was in decline. When he was born, Athens had already been at war with Sparta for four years, and he was twenty-three when Athens was finally defeated. Athens's citizenry then engaged in mutual recrimination, of which Socrates was a casualty. There ensued a quarter-century when Athens regained a position of regional strength, but under the democratic constitution which had made possible the capital sentence against Socrates. Then, during the final dozen years of Plato's life, Athens as political entity lived increasingly in the shadow of Macedon while Philip successfully advanced his imperial agenda.⁵ It was against such a political backdrop that Plato inscribed his final work, the *Laws*, onto wax tablets.

Plato's principal character in the *Laws* is the Athenian Stranger, who discusses the best possible constitution with Clinias of Crete and Megillus of Sparta. The convergence of representatives from three different cities bespeaks the proposal of the *Laws*, that the best polity will blend elements from constitutions of different countries. The Athenian Stranger observes that to rule men and women requires first the mean of measure:

If one neglects the rule of due measure (*to metrion*), and gives things too great in power to things too small – sails to ships, food to bodies, offices of rule to souls – then everything is upset, and they run, through the excess of insolence, some to bodily disorders, others to that offspring of insolence, injustice ... To guard against this, by perceiving the due measure (*to metrion*), is the task of the great lawgiver.⁶

This constitutional “due measure” or mean is no mere average, nor like Aristotle's Golden Mean that stands between two opposite extremes; rather, it is a mean of mixture. He praises this quality in the Spartan constitution in which monarchy, exemplifying the despotic principle,

and democracy, exemplifying the principle of freedom, are blended.⁷ The Athenian Stranger identifies the fault in the constitutions of Athens and Persia, respectively, which ultimately necessitated catastrophe. Each is based on a single principle, liberty in the case of Athens and despotism in the case of Persia.⁸ The Spartans, by contrast, founded their constitution on the mean which admixes despotism, perhaps better understood as order, and liberty. André Laks explains this model of mixed polity:

In other words, a mixture is required not simply between the ingredients (external mixture) but also within them (internal mixture). There is a democratic aspect to the “monarchical” (= competent) magistrate, who looks after the interests of the community, as the tyrant fails to do; and there is the monarchical aspect to the “democratic assembly,” which selects most of the magistrates. In the city of the *Laws* the competence of the assembly is extensive, and liberty itself belongs to all.⁹

Internal mixture gives content to the external mixture, and the external mixture gives structure to the internal mixture. It is the dynamic tension in the mixture of the two mixtures which makes the constitutional mean in which order and liberty are in perfect balance such that the maintenance of one ensures the preservation of the other. The Athenian Stranger explains his goal: “our idea being that a State ought to be free and wise and in friendship with itself.”¹⁰ Thus, through a blending of principles a political mean is achieved which is not possible in a constitution founded upon a single principle.

In the following analysis of Plato's text, care shall be paid to the order and relative placement of motifs and discussions. This care arises from a commitment to Plato's authorial method which communicates philosophical insight not only through the content of the speeches, rather also through the structure and dynamic interplay of the dialogue itself. Leo Strauss, taking a phrase from the *Phaedrus* (264b7), calls this quality of Plato's writing “logographic necessity.” He then characterizes it: “Every part of the written speech must be necessary for the whole; the place where each part occurs is the place where it is necessary that it should occur; in a word, the good writing must resemble the healthy animal which can do its proper work well.”¹¹ Jacob Klein may have put this interpretive principle most succinctly, “Every word in a Platonic dialogue counts.”¹² Though the principle of logographic necessity arises from the texts of Plato, once identified it can be used in analysis of other texts. It is also thus employed here in the analysis of *Pinocchio*.

The discussion of the puppet in the *Laws* provides a basis for reflecting upon this mean of mixture. The introduction of the puppet image comes early in the work, about three-quarters through book 1, which is to say, well before the lengthy discussion of monarchy and democracy in book 3. The image of the puppet, however, prepares the reader for the later thematic introduction of the mean of mixture. The treatment here returns to the metaphor of the puppet after the mean of mixture has been discovered. The Athenian Stranger introduces the puppet by inviting his fellows to play pretend with him. "Let us suppose ..." he says, not entirely unlike the trope "Once upon a time." He imagines aloud a game within the game of pretend, the play of puppeteering:

Let us suppose that each of us living creatures is an ingenious puppet of the gods, whether contrived by way of a toy of theirs or for some serious purpose – for as to that we know nothing; but this we do know, that these inward affections of ours, like sinews or cords, drag us along and, being opposed to each other, pull one against the other to opposite actions; and herein lies the dividing line between goodness and badness.¹³

The Stranger continues to analyse the puppet – the description is very like what in modernity is known as a marionette – especially the cords which suspend and control it, the golden cord of *logos* embodied in the law and the other non-golden cords which are also necessary to make the marionette work properly. Without multiple cords made from a variety of materials, the marionette will "fall flat."¹⁴ A marionette works precisely through the mean accomplished by a mixture of cords. Without the mixture, the marionette falls flat, which is what happens to a city with an unmixed polity, as exemplified by the extreme of democracy (as in Athens) or of monarchy (as in Persia). In the passage just cited about the marionette, after the words, "these inward affections of ours, like sinews or cords, drag us along and, being opposed to each other, pull one against the other to opposite actions," I suggest one could insert the phrase, "like democracy and monarchy." One could argue, against this view, that the Stranger here is contrasting the golden with the non-golden cords, *logos* in contrast to the passions. Upon closer examination, however, one sees that it is the non-golden cords, "the inward passions," pulling in opposite directions and thus suspending the marionette, which allows the golden cord to do its work. In the *polis* it is monarchy and democracy, representing the passionate forces of politics, which must be opposed to each other. The marionette must

be kept in an easy suspension so that *logos* can be operative. Held too tight, and movement is not possible; too loose, and the puppet goes slack or even falls flat. Seth Benardete comes close to this point without quite reaching it when he writes, "The puppet is suddenly a composite, with an inside that can be made to respond to the golden thread outside."¹⁵ It is curious that having made such an observation Benardete does not advance to describe how the puppet stands as the metaphor of the mean of mixture, the puppet specifically as the citizen seeking to live the good life in the puppet theatre of the city.

An aim of framing laws is to free humans to live according to *logos*, even while being constrained by passions and even external force. The puppeteer cannot coerce such freedom, but can, through the right laws, so habituate the citizen to external acts that conform with *logos* but for reasons other than *logos*. The person's external actions are brought into alignment with *logos* before a person's internal logic comes into alignment with *logos*. Citizenship is a category of becoming in accord with *logos*; it is an ontological category of seeming as being. The citizen is both a human being who, under rare and excellent circumstances, can live according to *logos*; he is also a puppet who can seem to live according to *logos* but who is actually being manipulated by the puppeteer. In a way that cannot ever quite be explained, when the citizen as puppet forgets that he is a puppet he actually becomes a human being, by acting like a human being, namely, by living in *logos*. The laws of the *polis* hold him in easy suspension, creating the possibility for *logos* to do its work. The more extensive orchestration of all the puppets approximates the life of the *polis* itself: the game within a game, the puppet citizen in the political life of play pretend is the political life.

That conclusion need not be reached by inference alone. The Athenian Stranger introduces the theme of the puppet in book 1 and recurs to it in book 7, which is to say as near the beginning of the *Laws'* second half as the introduction was near the beginning of the first half. The Stranger commends giving one's self to the condition of a marionette in the hands of God when he considers "by what means and by what modes of living we shall best navigate our barque of life through this voyage of existence." He continues:

What I assert is this ... that the object really worthy of all serious and blessed effort is God, while man is contrived, as we said above, to be a plaything of God, and the best part of him is really just that; and thus I say that every man and woman ought to pass through life in accordance with

this character, playing at the noblest of pastimes, being otherwise minded than they now are.¹⁶

This claim by the Stranger is extraordinary and – to the modern or postmodern mind, at least – counter-intuitive: the Stranger affirms that human beings are the puppets of God as a statement of hope and of freedom rather than of despair and of resigned determinism. Human beings, as citizens, should earnestly play at being marionettes in the puppet theatre of the *polis*.

The dialogue is entitled *Laws*, and thus it must be asked what role laws play in this marionette theatre. The laws are the cords which keep the marionette from falling flat. In times past, the Stranger says, laws were “unblended” (*akratos*).¹⁷ This in itself shows how far Plato has integrated into his methodology the mean of mixture as the ideal of possibility. Like the slave doctor who prescribes without any explanation or comfort, unblended laws order people to comply with the dictates of the law and threaten them with punishment if they do not comply. Brent Edwin Cusher, in chapter 11, discusses the work of the free doctor in contrast to the slave doctor. The slave doctor does not, perhaps cannot, explain to his patient – a fellow slave – why the cure must be followed. The free doctor, however, persuades his free patient. It is easy to imagine that moment. The free doctor holds up to his free patient the juxtaposition of conflicting passions: fear of the disease versus fear of the cure (e.g., the danger of gangrene and the shattering pain of amputation and cauterization). At the moment that the one fear is held in check by the other, the free patient is psychologically disposed to listen to reason. For the free patient as for the marionette, it is the equipoise of conflicting inward passions which allows the golden cord of *logos* to do its work. In this context, it is fitting to consider one of Plato's great innovations in this dialogue, the preamble¹⁸ (*proemium*), which explains the purpose of the law and why compliance with the law is best for the person and the *polis*, promising honour for the law-abiding and shame for the law-breaker to which is attached the prescription itself; thus, the preamble transforms being subject to legislation from a condition of slavery to one of freedom.¹⁹

If the metaphors of the double form of the law and of the marionette cords are themselves blended (the internal mixture and the external mixture), one can imagine the cords as laws. The puppet can be kept from falling flat by the single, steely cord of coercion, the monarchical principle, but he is both rigid and lifeless, without any resemblance to

life lived in *logos*. The role of the preambles is to be the “easy” part of the “easy suspension,” the democratic principle. Without the cord of coercion, however, this easy suspension permits flaccidity, and therefore the puppet is again without resemblance to life lived in *logos*. It is the blending of the two, persuasion and coercion, that can yield actions in the puppet which resemble life lived in *logos* and which, in an indiscernible way and moment, become truly human being.

André Laks observes that the legislator waits as long as possible to see if the persuasive part of the law (*proemium*) can do its work before the coercive part of the law is brought into play.²⁰ There is this second sense of suspension, not merely of the puppet but of legislation. For as long as possible, the puppet is held in suspense by the deferral of coercive legislation, to see if the cords of persuasion do their work before the puppeteer finally engages that steely cord of coercion, forcing the puppet to go through the motions of *logos*, and making it seem that the golden cord is operative when it is not. Coercive legislation becomes the last rather than the first recourse of the legislator. In his discussion of “the status of persuasion in the *Laws*,” Laks summarizes the two prevailing views of the preamble's function. He writes: “Against the tendentious but widespread interpretation which reduces the preamble to an exercise in manipulative rhetoric, some commentators have recently insisted that the persuasion at issue in the work is in principle rational.”²¹ Cusher reviews those two views at some length. The view argued here constitutes a third understanding to the two outlined by Laks and analysed by Cusher.²² The preamble works primarily through praise and blame; it may sometimes attain to the level of the rational. Its method of operation, however, is not its goal, which is ontological: in an indiscernible way and at an indiscernible moment the puppet becomes *human* being. Putting the puppet through the motions of *logos* is transcendently transformative. The denizen of the city was previously less than fully human, but his being has now become fully human through the work of the persuasive and coercive cords. The denizen who seemed to live according to *logos* has become a citizen who does truly live according to *logos*. Laks comes very close to this understanding, though without quite embracing it, when he writes in conclusion about the preamble: “It also confirms Plato's attention, in his late political work, to what one might call the spontaneous manifestations of rationality of the ‘human prodigy.’”²³ The Stranger seeks to create every possibility of setting the puppet free to be human with all the necessary safeguards in place to prevent him from falling flat.

The human marionette is perhaps only a plaything of the gods, perhaps something else, but both despite the cords and because of the cords, it *seems* not to be merely a puppet, but actually *to be* a human being. This is an important point which Seth Benardete seems to miss. He announces that the purpose of his book on the *Laws* is "to try to uncover its concealed ontological dimension and explain why it is concealed and how it comes to light."²⁴ He comes closest to recognizing the puppet as a principal metaphor by which the ontology of the *Laws* "comes to light" when he writes: "The puppet represents us as being put under a microscope, in whose field the stop-and-go character of our actions would become evident."²⁵ He misses the more obvious point of the puppet as a Pinocchio-like story, the puppet who by acting like a boy becomes a boy and, as the case in the *Laws*, the puppet who becomes human by acting like a citizen.²⁶ Pinocchio runs through all the extremes in the human appetites and passions but as a puppet. When he is guided by reason and virtue he becomes truly human and the wooden puppet is no longer necessary as a means to becoming and being. Thus, the story ends with the limp puppet "propped against a chair," and Pinocchio the boy is full of joy.²⁷

The puppet appears only at two critical moments in Plato's *Laws*, but the puppet makes up the whole of Collodi's book. When he set pen to paper "rather grudgingly" in 1881 for the first chapter in the magazine serial which would become the children's classic, Italy had been united for twenty years.²⁸ After the initial excitement of having achieved most of the Risorgimento's major aims, the new Italy was mired in internecine strife among the various parties which had sought unity but on different premises of political philosophy. Royalists (followers of the triumphant Victor Emmanuel) and hard-line republicans (among whom Giuseppe Mazzini was the foremost) fought each other even as both sought to create a new national unity. It was not, however, merely factional strife which threatened the new nation. There was also a lack of coherent vision to inspire virtuous self-denial among those who welcomed the success of Italy over old local distinctions as well as against the two political entities with larger claims, the Papal States and Austria as hegemon of north-eastern Italy. Benedetto Croce (1866–1952) writes of the period 1871–90: "Where decadence, in comparison with the preceding period, can really be observed in Italy is with regard to vigour and breadth of thought."²⁹ Croce grew up and came of age during this period, and writes of it as an eyewitness observer. He acknowledges that "orthodox Catholicism, which was not

wholly exhausted by clericalism ... continued to guide souls along the paths of virtue."³⁰ There were others, however, who had sought guidance from secular lights. Mazzini (1805–72), for example, was influenced by the French philosopher Saint-Simon (1760–1825), and thus was committed to a new civil religion of humanity which required an educational program to make possible and then to support the new political regime.³¹ By the time of Mazzini's death, the energy of that secularist vision was spent. Croce writes: "After the middle of the century, however, the current was arrested and grew stagnant, owing to an obstacle that was not so much materialism ... as naturalism, with its corollary, agnosticism."³² He offers an incisive comment about education, reflecting presumably upon his own experience: "Theories of education were full of hygiene and medicine, and empty of spiritual values."³³ The revolutionaries who had contributed so much to Italy's nationhood seemed merely old-fashioned to the generation emerging in the 1870s and 1880s. Again, Benedetto Croce comments: "The men of the old Left ... inherited something of the heroic age, and always responded to great ideas, thus showing that they had not followed Mazzini in vain, and had not for nothing dreamed of a moral and religious revival in Italian social life. But the new generation, which was growing up about 1880, was prosaic and narrow-minded."³⁴ Reading Croce's assessment of nineteenth-century Italy, one recalls how Morrow assessed Plato's view of Athens. In each case, a heroic generation had done its work, but had not been able to form a successor generation to consolidate and build upon its monumental achievement.

It was precisely at this moment that a man "of the old Left" evidenced his commitment to the "moral and religious revival in Italian social life" – albeit the civil religion of Saint-Simon – as well as his disillusionment with the way Italians made use of their newly won status as citizens of a nation: in 1881, Carlo Collodi commenced writing *The Adventures of Pinocchio*.³⁵ The end sought not only by Mazzini and his followers but by all the factional leaders of the Risorgimento was best expressed by Massimo Taparelli, Marchese d'Azeglio (1798–1866), that "now Italy was made, what remained to be done was to make Italians."³⁶ The Risorgimento had been successful in creating the structure of political unity; the leaders of the new Italy then discovered the work of creating cultural and social cohesion to be far more challenging. As David Tabachnick and Toivo Koivukoski note in this work's preface, political structure alone is inadequate to make a true republic; a correspondent political culture is needed as well. It was to that need which Collodi wrote.

While much has been written about *The Adventures of Pinocchio*, there is little information available in the English literature about the book's author, Carlo Lorenzini, who wrote under the name Carlo Collodi after the Tuscan village where his mother had been born.³⁷ His parents arranged for him to receive priestly formation, which left him "steeped ... in classical literature and thought."³⁸ In 1848 – the momentous year of revolutions – Lorenzini had just come of age. Like Mazzini, he embraced armed revolt as an appropriate and necessary means to achieve a unitary Italian state.³⁹ Lorenzini participated in the campaigns of 1848 and 1859 against Austria.⁴⁰ He also engaged the work of unification through his journalism and through his entry into the new genre of children's literature.⁴¹ In 1875, he began his apprenticeship as a children's author with the translation into Italian of the French fairy tales by Charles Perrault. It was as the translator of those stories that Lorenzini first adopted his pen name.⁴² Lorenzini wrote for adults; Collodi for children. As Collodi, he went on to write a series of "successful pedagogical" novels about boy heroes.⁴³ In 1881, he began his serialized novel about Pinocchio, which he intended to end with chapter 15 when Pinocchio is hanged. Italian children insisted that Pinocchio must live, and Collodi responded by completing and thereby also transforming *The Adventures of Pinocchio*. He seems not to have suspected the power of his own story, as indicated both by his plan to end the book prematurely and by his characterization of it as puerile in a letter to his publishers: "I'm sending you this baby-talk ... Do what you like with it."⁴⁴ It is lovely to think that precisely the children whom he was determined to improve recognized the genius of the work not recognized by Collodi himself. That historical occurrence has a fascinating literary parallel in Plato's *Laws*, when the Athenian Stranger imagines a pleasure contest among various entertainments in which, as Seth Benardete observes, "the very small children" give the prize to the puppeteer.⁴⁵

Ann Lawson Lucas calls into question the ideological appropriations of Collodi's book, whether Marxist, Freudian, or Christian allegorical, summing up her critique in a sentence: "Many of these elaborate theories now seem dated, but *parti pris* interpretations will continue to emerge following each new intellectual vogue."⁴⁶ If we freely accept Lucas's implicit warning, nevertheless, underlying every work of art is some kind of philosophical framework. The attempt here is to discover some part of that framework as disclosed in the text of *Pinocchio*. Although Lucas writes as a literary critic, her own estimation of the

currents running throughout the book are consonant with the philosophical themes which shall be adumbrated here. She writes: "*Pinocchio* has hidden depths; it is, indeed, imbued with Lorenzini's most fundamental perceptions, not only of human nature, but of life in society; his sympathy for the poor, his criticism of social and political institutions, and his detestation of hierarchies are all here."⁴⁷ Collodi's life and commitments in relation to the Risorgimento serve as blinders in the best sense to keep the reader attentive to his text, discovering what is salient in it without importing the critic's views into the text.

Pinocchio has become an icon of popular culture, a circumstance carefully documented by Richard Wunderlich and Thomas J. Morrissey in their *Pinocchio Goes Postmodern: Perils of a Puppet in the United States*. This is a case, however, of a book more famous than read.⁴⁸ For that reason, it may be useful to rehearse the outline of the story, especially with respect to those members of the *dramatis personae* to be discussed here. The book opens with a piece of wood about to be turned into a table leg by Master Cherry, who is startled when the piece of wood talks to him. Geppetto knocks at Master Cherry's door, and asks for a piece of wood to transform into a puppet. After an argument and scuffle, Geppetto leaves with the piece of wood. He begins carving the figure of a puppet, and as he does so, the puppet becomes increasingly lively. Pinocchio begins his wayward adventures through disobedience and then by running away. The rest of the story is a kind of odyssey in which Pinocchio tries to find his way back home. He soon arrives in the company of the Fox and Cat, who defraud and seek to murder him. The Blue Fairy intervenes as she does for the balance of the story, though in various guises. It is part of Pinocchio's special insight that he is able to recognize the Blue Fairy even when she in no way resembles herself in previous rescues. There is an ape judge who jails Pinocchio because he has been robbed, a farmer who literally puts him in the doghouse, a policeman who wrongly arrests him, a fisherman who endeavours to fry him as side-meat for breakfast, Lampwick who seduces him to travel to Toyland where he becomes an ass, Mini-Man who sells Pinocchio the ass to a circus, the Ringmaster who abuses him, the subsequent purchaser who throws him into the sea, and, finally, the Shark, which eats him. In the Shark's belly, Pinocchio is reunited with his dear daddy, Geppetto, and then devises a means of escape, carrying Geppetto on his back out of the Shark, which is reminiscent of Aeneas carrying Anchises from burning Troy. Pinocchio and Geppetto return home, where they live happily ever

after, Pinocchio having become “a proper little boy,”⁴⁹ and, it must also be said, Geppetto having become a proper father. That is the story, but there is much more to the book than just the story.

One finds on the very first page important claims both metaphysical and political. Here are the oft-quoted first lines:

Once upon a time there was ...

“A king!” my little readers will say at once.

No, children, you’re wrong. Once upon a time there was a piece of wood.⁵⁰

Collodi begins with the fairy-tale formula. This is not merely a work of fiction, but also a make-believe story in which anything might happen. At the same time, this fairy tale begins by addressing a political premise and expectation, namely, that there should be a king. The Mazzinian republican, Carlo Lorenzini a.k.a. Collodi, is telling the children of Italy’s citizens, that is, the future citizens of Italy, that they have made a mistake by beginning their new nation with a king. The story begins with a very different metaphysical and political premise, “a piece of wood.” Though Collodi was classically educated, one does not have to suppose he was thinking of Plato and Aristotle as he wrote *Pinocchio* in order to see principles of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy in his pages. One may note, for example, that wood is material and, further, that the Greek word for “wood,” *hulē*, was Aristotle’s choice to designate matter.⁵¹ This piece of wood surprises Master Cherry by speaking, much as the people of Italy surprised dukes, kings, and even an emperor by speaking up. The piece of wood was not matter only; it was also ensouled. This piece of animated matter is the first premise of the new nation, because the challenge before Italy after 1861 was not whether they could make kings – there were more than enough of them about – but whether they could make citizens – of which there were all too few. Could the human-like denizens of the new Italy become fully human as citizens? That was the question on the mind of Collodi.

The second chapter of *Pinocchio* can be read as displaying the problem of establishing public discourse. The nascent citizen, still only a talking piece of wood, overhears his betters, Master Cherry and Geppetto, arguing in a fashion not unlike that of parliamentary debates in the new Italy. Geppetto wore a wig which reminded children of a bowl of “corn-meal mush.” The piece of wood calls Geppetto by his street nickname, “Corn Head.” Geppetto supposes that the epithet must have come from

Master Cherry. They engage in an exchange of which the Monty Python “Argument Clinic”⁵² is reminiscent:

“Why are you insulting me?”

“Who’s insulting you?”

“You called me Corn Head.”

“It wasn’t me.”

“Oh, I suppose you’re saying it was *me*? I say it was you.”

“Was not.”

“Was too.”

“Was not!”

“Was too!”

As tempers flared, words gave way to deeds, and they scratched, bit, and battered each other as they fought.⁵³

That pointless exchange parodies the scenes in the Italian parliament which Christopher Duggan describes with scholarly nuance:

In the early 1880s the situation appeared to be getting worse ... But the problem in Italy was that it coincided with a general revulsion towards parliament and growing anxieties about the country’s “decadence” ... The blurring of party lines and the sense that the Chamber was dissolving into a quagmire of unprincipled factions held together by the bargaining skills of the pliable but personally honest Depretis (one leading contemporary compared him to an English water closet that stayed clean despite the filth passing through it).⁵⁴

Passion, sentiment, and parochialism abounded. The means of civil debate eluded the people and politicians of the new Italy. One reasonably then asks what the root causes were of such public irascibility.

Like the dual nature of the puppet, the problem of Italians’ readiness to squabble also has both material and spiritual causes. In chapter 3, Collodi points to the philosophical counterpoint of seeming and being which underlies the material challenge to creation of a true republic. He describes Geppetto’s room in terms of broken furniture and general disarray. The impression of dire poverty is complete when he tells the reader, “On the rear wall you could see a fireplace with a glowing fire, but it was a painted fire, and above it was a painted pot, which boiled merrily and gave off steam that really looked like steam.”⁵⁵ He signals that Pinocchio is “Everyman,” when Geppetto explains his rationale

for the choice of the puppet's name, "I once knew an entire family by that name ... The richest one was a beggar."⁵⁶ There are other signs of extreme poverty throughout the novel.⁵⁷ Corresponding to material want is spiritual appetite. It is tempting to think of appetite as material, but the strange fact about appetite is that material goods are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the satisfaction of appetite. Pinocchio attempts to eat from the painted pot on the wall. Unsatisfied, his hunger leads to reflection about his disrespectful treatment of Geppetto, his "daddy"; thus, material want leads him to awareness of a purely spiritual want.⁵⁸ Night falls, but Pinocchio searches for food. There was a thunderstorm which terrified him, "but his hunger was greater than his fear" and despair was added to the opposing forces within him.⁵⁹ Pinocchio repeatedly bumps into the world in his various states, and Collodi presents those encounters as occasions for the experience of injustice, usually in hues of the darkest comic relief. On "the dark and stormy night" – the storm, by the way, is a dry one without rain – Pinocchio begs for food from a householder who appears at an upstairs window. He promises food to the supplicant, but instead dumps water on his head. The householder, in a sense, provides the rain which the storm had not. Nature inspires fear, but no sustenance. What nature withheld is provided by man, but only as retribution. Umberto Eco begins a brief reflection on the opening lines of *Pinocchio* by observing, "Certainly the author has, at his disposal, particular genre signals that he can use to give instructions to his model reader; but frequently these signals can be highly ambiguous."⁶⁰ His assessment is apposite to the entire novel and not merely its opening lines. After Pinocchio's drenching, the reader may well ask, "Is there no justice in the world?" The immediate and superficial response is that there is not. Pinocchio was promised bread, but was given an unwanted bath. Instead of being nourished, he was humiliated. Here one notes the ambiguity. At a deeper and more enduring level, there is justice in the story. He was hungry, afraid, despairing, and – in the end – wet because he had been disobedient. His lack of virtue, his wilful pursuit to satisfy appetites and passions is justly rewarded. The dynamic of the unjust entity unknowingly distributing justice as an instrument in the hand of providence – if only a secularized notion of providence – persists throughout the story. That is true of Pinocchio's encounter with the Fox and the Cat, the ape judge, the farmer, the policemen, the fisherman, Lampwick and Mini-Man, the Ringmaster, the buyer of the ass, and the Shark. At the same time, there are limits set for those who would do him ill. An unequal dualism

is at work throughout the novel. Good and evil engage each other in the person of Pinocchio, but every malevolent being is mysteriously subordinate to the benevolent providence of the Blue Fairy. At least for those who have discernment enough to recognize the hand of that benevolent providence – and Pinocchio, for all his failings, is blessed with such a gift – there is actually something better than justice in the world, namely, redemption.

The *volta* of the story comes in chapter 25, just past the book's half-way point and, significantly, well after that point where Collodi continued because the children of Italy had insisted. Pinocchio has attained a certain virtue because of his strenuous efforts to find his "daddy," Geppetto. He has landed on "an island in the middle of the sea,"⁶¹ where he meets "a good little woman," whom Pinocchio recognizes as the Blue Fairy.⁶² Pinocchio expresses his amazement that the Blue Fairy has "grown up" from the girl he had known before to the woman she is now. As the being who intervenes on behalf of Pinocchio, she is a providential power. In the counsel she gives him, she is the golden cord of *logos* who seeks to guide him even as his passions pull him in opposite directions. He has come to himself and declares his heartfelt wish to grow up too:

"But you can't grow," replied the Fairy.

"Why not?"

"Because puppets never grow. They're born as puppets, they live as puppets, and they die as puppets."

"Oh, I'm sick of always being just a puppet!" shouted Pinocchio, smacking himself on the forehead. "It's about time I grew up too and became a man."

"And you will, if you can earn it."

"Really? How do I earn it?"

"It's the easiest thing in the world: just practice being a proper boy."⁶³

There follows a checklist of qualities which "a proper boy" must possess. In short, he must evidence virtue and reason. Here is a marvellous point about the relationship of human-like Italian to truly human citizen and, equally, of seeming, becoming, and being. One can become a truly human citizen by seeming like such a citizen. Performing citizen-like activities (e.g., telling the truth, pursuing knowledge, having a good heart, working hard, and contributing to the common good through a worthy art or trade)⁶⁴ transforms a person from a bundle of appetites and passions into an integral human citizen. That is to say, if a person

acts like a citizen continuously, then that person will *be* a citizen and thereby also achieve the end of *being* fully human. In a sense, Collodi had given up on the governing generation of 1881. He had sensed that, as in the kingdom of God, it would also be true in the modern secular nation state that "a little child shall lead them."⁶⁵ Collodi gives to Geppetto a key statement in the final dozen lines of the book: "When children who were once naughty become nice, their whole families change and become happier."⁶⁶ It is not the adults who will convert the children, rather the children who will transform Italy. Clearly, that transformation will take place through education afforded children by adults, but it is even clearer throughout the novel that many adults are irredeemable. Their instrumentality in the hand of a benign providence will remain unwitting. The family of the Italian nation shall rise or fall by the puppet children who either will or will not become fully human citizens. Pinocchio, for his part, discovers his highest good by escaping puppethood. In the final two sentences, he exclaims, "How funny I was when I was a puppet! And how happy I am now that I have become a proper little boy."⁶⁷ Until the final pages, the reader does not know which of Pinocchio's sentiments will prevail, his baser passions or his real love and appreciation for both Geppetto and the Blue Fairy. It is with Pinocchio as the Athenian Stranger observed: "These inward affections of ours, like sinews or cords, drag us along and, being opposed to each other, pull one against the other to opposite actions; and herein lies the dividing line between goodness and badness."⁶⁸ Pinocchio's passions keep him (and Collodi's audience) in suspense, so that the golden cord of reason can do its work in both the puppet and the audience. In attending to Collodi's lifelong commitments, the reader learns from Pinocchio and his adventures that the human being attains happiness as a citizen living in accord with virtue and reason, fully engaged in the political community.

Brand and Pertile, writing in *The Cambridge History of Italian Literature*, assess the place of *Pinocchio* in Italian culture: "Critics agree that *Pinocchio* may be read as a kind of *Bildungsroman*, aimed at showing that for a child to grow into a good citizen he must abandon the puppet within him and become trustworthy, dependable and respectful of society's rules."⁶⁹ They are certainly right to speak of what is necessary in order "for a child to grow into a good citizen," and it may be added that in order for the puppet-like child to become a fully mature adult, it is necessary at the same time to become a well-formed citizen. That is to suggest a premise underlying Collodi's novel, namely, to be

truly human one must be rightly engaged in the political community. Not only, pace Aristotle, is the human being the political animal, but in order to be more than animal, the human must be political.

The civil body politic, rightly constituted, comprises the system of cords which does not ensure that humans attain to being, but only creates the *opportunity* for humans to attain to being, that is, to live the good life in the well-ordered *polis*. At the end of book 3 of the *Laws*, it is this that the Athenian Stranger says is "the object of all these discourses": "to discover how best a State might be managed, and how best the individual citizen might pass his life."⁷⁰ This is the happy symbiosis of which Geoffrey Kellow writes here in the "Introduction": the being of the *polis* nurturing the being of citizens and in turn the *polis* nurtured by her citizens. The former necessarily fails without the latter. Although Collodi does not provide us with a corresponding declaration in *The Adventures of Pinocchio*, the same aim is implicit throughout: human life is as citizen in the city. Plato and Collodi both chide and encourage their countrymen to recalibrate their standards of citizenship. Read retrospectively, one sees the prophetic character of their puppets; there is an admonitory forth-telling and a foretelling of inevitable consequences if the prophetic word is not heeded. Athens – given to the democratic principle alone – became subject to Macedon and, thereafter, never again attained real political importance. The new Italy in all its cascading constitutions has vacillated between the lawlessness of chaos and the lawlessness of tyranny. The fatal flaw has been the unblended or – at very best – the improperly blended presence of the despotic and democratic principles. In this regard, Plato saw much more clearly than Collodi. The puppet conjured by the Athenian Stranger worked. He was a marionette which functioned properly. A point often missed about Pinocchio is that he was a failure as a puppet. In chapter 10, Pinocchio's entrance into the puppet theatre "triggered a small revolution." There was a family reunion of sorts among the puppets, but it brought the performance to a halt.⁷¹ Collodi celebrates this failure; the scene depicts the escape from tyranny to freedom. For the Athenian Stranger, by contrast, the marionette had to operate effectively in the puppet theatre. In this life, there is no escaping the performance in the theatre: that is the life of the citizen in the city. On the stage of the city, the puppeteer legislates the steely cords of the marionette and coaxes the marionette with preambles, thereby putting the puppet through the motions of the rational life of virtue in the hope that the golden cord may descend and take hold. This is the part of the story

that Collodi and Italy miss. Freedom must be a means to order, and coercion a means to freedom. The despotic and democratic principles must be admixed both externally and internally, keeping citizens and city alike in suspense. Pinocchio is, indeed, held in suspense by his passions, but Collodi has omitted the passionate rule of despots. His is, after all, a book which begins by *not* being about a king; it ends with praise for Pinocchio's devotion to his daddy, but a father who has long since ceased to be a despot. The beauty of the Athenian Stranger's proposal is that he does not ask humans to be better than they are. He proposes to juxtapose two of the worst human tendencies – the passion to dominate another and the passion to be completely free from such domination. They counteract each other, thus giving virtue and reason a momentary chance *to be*.⁷² Plato understood well how precarious is every human effort towards nobility in life. His Athenian Stranger sets forth the mean of mixed polity as a path of ascent, all the while understanding that in any attempted ascent to rational and virtuous being the human often hangs not by a cord, golden or steel, but by the merest thread.

NOTES

- 1 Collodi "broadly sympathized with the ideas of Mazzini, Risorgimento theorist, idealist, and insurrectionist whose aim was an egalitarian Republic of Italy." Ann Lawson Lucas, "Introduction," *The Adventures of Pinocchio*, by Carlo Collodi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), xii. Quoted in Richard Wunderlich and Thomas Morrissey, *Pinocchio Goes Postmodern: Perils of a Puppet in the United States* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 3–4.
- 2 Aristotle, *Politics* 8.1337a11–19. Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, 2 vols., ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2: 2121.
- 3 Glenn R. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the "Laws"* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 86–7.
- 4 For a different view, T.H. Irwin writes: "However much [Plato] objects to democracy, he assumes that, practically speaking, the Athenian democracy is stable, and that no feasible alternative is likely to be superior." T.H. Irwin, "The Intellectual Background," in *The Cambridge Companion to Plato*, ed. Richard Kraut (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 62. Irwin makes clear that this is, in fact, his own view and that he thinks he is merely agreeing with Plato. His view, further, is that Plato – satisfied that politically things cannot be much better than they are – is led "back to ethical

- problems." *Ibid.*, 63. Though Irwin makes reference to both *Republic* and *Laws*, he does not seem to have taken them seriously into account. Neither the constitution proposed in the former, led by guardians, nor the mean of mixed polity advocated in the latter – a theme to be examined below – accord with Irwin's conclusions. Why would Plato write his final dialogue, concerned with every aspect of the civil body political and synthesizing multiple political traditions, if he was satisfied with the current state of affairs in Athens? Even Irwin acknowledges that Plato "objects to democracy."
- 5 Arnold Wycombe Gomme and Nicholas Geoffrey Lemprière Hammond, "Athens (Historical Outline)," in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. N.G.L. Hammond and Howard Hayes Scullard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 140–1.
 - 6 Plato, *Laws*, trans. R.G. Bury Loeb Classical Library, vols. 10 and 11, nos. 187 and 192 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 216–17 (3.691c1–d5). Hereafter, L. 3.691c1–d5; Bury 1.216–17.
 - 7 L. 3.691d8–92b1 and 3.701e1–8.
 - 8 L. 3.699e1–6.
 - 9 André Laks, "The *Laws*," in *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Political Thought*, ed. Christopher Rowe et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 279.
 - 10 L. 3.693b1–5; Bury 1.216–17.
 - 11 Leo Strauss, *The City and Man* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964), 53. Stanley Rosen follows his mentor on this point: "It is now very widely accepted that one cannot understand Plato's philosophical teaching apart from the most careful consideration of its literary presentation." Stanley Rosen, *Plato's "Republic": A Study* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 353. Jacob Howland makes a similar point, "One cannot understand Plato without paying due attention to his style." Jacob Howland, *The "Republic": The Odyssey of Philosophy* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1993), 25.
 - 12 Jacob Klein, *Lectures and Essays*, ed. Robert B. Williamson and Elliot Zuckerman (Annapolis, MD: St John's College Press, 1985), 310.
 - 13 L. 1.644d7–e4; Bury 68–9.
 - 14 L. 1.644e4–45c6.
 - 15 Seth Benardete, *Plato's "Laws": The Discovery of Being* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 48.
 - 16 L. 7.803b2–c8; Bury 2.52–5.
 - 17 L. 4.723a1–2.
 - 18 Cusher translates this Greek term as "prelude" (p. 232).
 - 19 L. 4.719c1–b5. The key passage is 4.722e.1–23b6.
 - 20 Laks, "The *Laws*," 265.

- 21 Ibid., 289.
- 22 Thus, while appreciating Cushner's rich treatment of the preamble of the *Laws*, my own conclusion differs from his. In the end, his position is that the preamble is not rational, citing the "dizziness and whirling" caused by argument (*Laws* 10.892e5–93a7) and the necessary taming of the citizen (10.890c6–8). In fact, in the former cited passage, the Stranger proposes proceeding carefully through this argument until demonstration is complete.
- 23 Laks, "The *Laws*," 290.
- 24 Benardette, *Plato's "Laws,"* xii.
- 25 Ibid., 48.
- 26 Laks also stumbles on this point. Laks, "The *Laws*," 277.
- 27 Carlo Collodi, *The Adventures of Pinocchio*, trans. Geoffrey Brock, intro. by Umberto Eco and afterword by Rebecca West (New York: New York Review Books, 2009), 160.
- 28 Christopher Duggan, *The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy since 1796* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 281.
- 29 Benedetto Croce, *A History of Italy: 1871–1915*, trans. Cecilia M. Ady (New York: Russell and Russell, 1963), 126.
- 30 Ibid., 127.
- 31 Duggan, *Force of Destiny*, 128–9.
- 32 Croce, *History*, 127.
- 33 Ibid., 132.
- 34 Ibid., 139.
- 35 Lucas, "Introduction," xxi.
- 36 Ibid., xx.
- 37 Rebecca West, afterword to *The Adventures of Pinocchio* (2009), 165. "Biographical information in English is not abundant." Wunderlich and Morrissey, *Postmodern*, 3.
- 38 Wunderlich and Morrissey, *Postmodern*, 3.
- 39 Duggan, *Force of Destiny*, 119, 130. Mazzini was "above all a terrorist." Rosario Romeo, in *La Repubblica* (Rome), 20 April 1977, quoted by Denis Mack Smith in *Mazzini* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 230.
- 40 Wunderlich and Morrissey, *Postmodern*, 4.
- 41 Lucas characterizes Lorenzini's journalism both before and after his second service as a soldier in 1859. Before that date, he was a cultural, and in particular a literary, commentator. After 1859, he "plunged again into his career in journalism." Lucas, "Introduction," xvii. His work was sufficiently noteworthy that "he was commissioned by the new government to write a polemical pamphlet against a reactionary apologist for the *ancien régime* of the Grand Dukes." Ibid., xvii.

- 42 Ibid., xix.
- 43 West, "Afterword," 166. Wunderlich and Morrissey, *Postmodern*, 4.
- 44 Lucas, "Introduction," xxii.
- 45 Benardete, *Plato's "Laws,"* 68; *L.* 2.658c10–11.
- 46 Lucas, "Introduction," xlv–v. One may add to her list the feminist interpretation as exemplified by West's afterword to Brock's 2009 translation.
- 47 Ibid., xii.
- 48 When I use Pinocchio in my course on philosophy of human nature, I ask my students how many know the character (everyone), how many have seen the Disney movie (nearly everyone), and how many have read the book (hardly anyone).
- 49 Collodi, *Pinocchio*, 160.
- 50 Ibid., 3.
- 51 Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. with a revised supplement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), s.v. *hulē*.
- 52 See <http://www.montypython.net/scripts/argument.php> and <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kQFKtI6gn9Y>.
- 53 Collodi, *Pinocchio*, 6–7.
- 54 Duggan, *Force of Destiny*, 318–19.
- 55 Collodi, *Pinocchio*, 9.
- 56 Ibid., 9.
- 57 E.g., "And Pinocchio, though he was a very cheerful boy, grew sad, too, because poverty, if it's true poverty, is understood by everyone, even children." Ibid., 25.
- 58 Ibid., 16–17.
- 59 Ibid., 19.
- 60 Umberto Eco, *Six Walks in the Fictional Woods* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 10.
- 61 Collodi, *Pinocchio*, 84.
- 62 Ibid., 87–9.
- 63 Ibid., 90–1.
- 64 Ibid., 91–2.
- 65 Isaiah 11:6 (Authorized Version).
- 66 Collodi, *Pinocchio*, 160.
- 67 Ibid.
- 68 *L.* 1.644d7–e4; Bury 68–9.
- 69 Peter Brand and Lino Pertile, eds, *The Cambridge History of Italian Literature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 471. On *Pinocchio* as

Bildungsroman, see also Wunderlich and Morrissey, *Postmodern*, 9, and Umberto Eco, "Introduction," *The Adventures of Pinocchio* (2009), x.

70 L. 3.702a7–b1; Bury 250–1.

71 Collodi, *Pinocchio*, 30–1.

72 Tabachnick and Koivukoski discuss Machiavelli's two types of human nature, that is, "those who want to oppress others" and those whose "desire [is] simply not to be oppressed." Speaking anachronistically, Plato transcends Machiavelli by recognizing that everyone has these two tendencies and that it is the equipoise achieved by juxtaposition of the two in any given person which creates the possibility of truly human being.

15 Unity in Multiplicity: Agency and Aesthetics in German Republicanism

DOUGLAS MOGGACH

Between the French Revolution and the revolutions of 1848, German republicanism derives its specific features from an extension and elaboration of Kant's juridical and ethical thought. It applies to political relations and interactions the concept of autonomy, the rational self-legislation of modern subjects. It takes account of decisive characteristics of modern political experience which differentiate it from antiquity: namely, the diversity, and not the homogeneity of interests (hence ruling out the Spartan model as inapplicable); the conflict among such interests, and the central political problem of effecting their harmonization; and the self-given rather than naturally determined character of the ends of action, opening up the prospect of active self-change rather than the mere assertion of particular interests. In this way two sets of contrasts appear: between the ancient and the modern forms of state, and between liberal and republican versions of the latter. The ancient is taken to represent the immersion of the citizen in the body politic, with inadequate attention to subjective effort and initiative in shaping, criticizing, and validating public norms; and the liberal is taken to consecrate existing private interests, and thus to constrain and distort the potentially transformative effects of public life. German republicanism defends autonomy against both heteronomous submersion in communal values and the blandishments of possessive individualism. This is its achievement and its legacy.

Kant describes the Enlightenment as an epochal turning point for humanity: the shaking off of self-imposed tutelage, marking the historical maturation of the species.¹ Traditional and transcendent sources of authority are deprived of their unreflective influence, and yield to critical adjudication and self-legislation by rational subjects. Kant had