Stein, in an attempt to fortify the realist position she fears is not satisfactorily established by a “moderate” Thomist view, champions the “essential” as a distinct kind of finite being by which units-of-meaning are. This pushes up wrinkles elsewhere in her ontology, however—particularly in difficulties that arise regarding the relationship between such essential being and the eternal being of God. These difficulties are brought to a head in Stein’s puzzling treatment of the divine ideas, which appear to have deep and conflicting affinities with both the essential and the eternal. This article analyzes Stein’s contested consideration of the complex intersection of essential and eternal being in the divine ideas, unpacking her seemingly disparate assertions to bring to light a “dual countenance” according to which the divine ideas can be identified with essential being in one sense and eternal being in another—thereby maintaining intentional tension while resisting outright contradiction.